John Hillas Papers

Department of Economics University of Auckland Private Bag 92019 Auckland NEW ZEALAND email: j.hillas@auckland.ac.nz phone: 64 9-373 7599 ext. 87349 FAX: 64 9-373 7427

This page contains links to a number of my papers in pdf form.

pdf files

 

• "Correlated Equilibrium and Nash Equilibrium as an Observer's Assessment of the Game," (joint with Elon Kohlberg and John Pratt)
• "Foundations of Strategic Equilibrium," (joint with Elon Kohlberg) now published in Handbook of Game Theory, Volume 3, edited by Robert J. Aumann and Sergiu Hart.
• "On the Relation Among Some Definitions of Strategic Stability," (joint with Mathijs Jansen, Jos Potters, and Dries Vermeulen) now published in Mathematics of Operations Research.
• "On the Relation Between Perfect Equilibria in Extensive Form Games and Proper Equilibria in Normal Form Games,"
• "A Game Illustrating Some Features of the Definition of Strategic Stability,"
• "Correlated Equilibria of Two Person Repeated Games with Random Signals," (joint with Min Liu)
• "Renegotiation in Screening Games," (currently doesn’t have very useful versions of the figures)
• "Nonverifiable Testing in Markets with Asymmetric Information," (a very much revised version of the paper below)
• "Costly Testing in Markets with Asymmetric Information,"  (currently doesn’t have very useful versions of the figures)
• "How Much of `Forward Induction’ Is Implied by `Backward Induction’ and `Ordinality’?"

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Last updated: 1 August 2007